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Fairness is in the eye of the beholder




Fairness is a desirable property of decision rules applied to a population of
individuals. For example, college admissions should be decided on variables
describing merit, but may also need to take into account the fact that certain
communities are inherently disadvantaged. At the same time, individuals should
not feel that another individual in a similar situation obtained an unfair advan-
tage. All this must be taken into account while still caring about optimizing for
a decision maker’s utility function.
In particular, for a given distribution over a population, we wish to derive a
decision rule that takes into account a merit variable, but also ensures fairness for
members of disadvantaged groups. The problem becomes even more challenging
when we take into account potential uncertainties in decision making models,
which can even make strict notions of fairness impossible to satisfy.
As an example, consider the problem of fair prediction with disparate im-
pact as defined by Chouldechova [2016]. Informally, their formulation defines a
statistic a such that true category y (also called outcome or true label) is condi-
tionally independent of a sensitive variable z given the statistic and the model
parameters θ, i.e. y ⊥ z | a, θ. When we face uncertainties in our modeling
assumptions, the natural thing is to impose that the conditional independence
holds if we marginalize the parameters out, i.e. y ⊥ z | a. As we argue later
in the paper, such a condition is impossible to satisfy, even if it holds for ev-
ery possible parameter value, and we must incorporate subjectivity when model
parameters are uncertain.
We instead develop a natural, and widely applicable framework for fairness
that relies on the available information. We develop algorithms for achieving
a few different notions of fairness within the subjective framework, and in par-
ticualr recently proposed concepts of fairness that are grounded in concepts of
similarity and conditional independence. We argue that a suitable notion of
similarity in the Bayesian setting is distributional similarity conditioned on the
observations. For the latter, as independence is difficult to achieve uniformly
in the Bayesian setting, we suggest a relaxation, for which we provide a small
experimental demonstration.
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2 Constraints on distributions and impossibility
results
Chouldechova [2016] considers the problem of fair prediction with disparate
impact. In this context, a statistic a : Ω → A is test-fair in some underlying
probability space (Ω,Σ, Pθ), with respect to the outcome y : Ω → Y and
sensitive variable z : Ω → Z, if y is independent of z under the statistic and
parameter θ, i.e. if y ⊥ z | a, θ. While the authors do not explicitly discuss the
distribution Pθ, it must be known in order for us to be able to find a statistic a
satisfying this property.
Kleinberg et al. [2016] consider feature vectors x : Ω → X and groups
z : Ω → Z that correspond to the sensitive variables of Chouldechova [2016].
Their decision rule consists of a conditional distribution π(a | x) that assigns in-
dividuals to a finite A called “bins”. There is also a score function U : A → [0, 1]
corresponding to the utility of that bin. Finally, there is a categorical variable
y : Ω → { 0, 1 }. They consider three fairness conditions, which we re-interpret
below, subsuming two of them into a general “balance” condition:
U(a) = P πθ (y = 1 | a, z) (calibration)
E
π
θ (U | y, z) = E
π
θ (U | y, z
′). (balance)
The authors show that these cannot can be simultaneously achieved under
the distribution P πθ induced by the underlying latent parameter θ and the de-
cision rule π. However, a sufficient condition for balance is the independence:
U ⊥ z | y, θ, π, i.e. when P πθ (U | y, z) = P
π
θ (U | y). In contrast to the condition
in Chouldechova [2016], it is the decision variable U that is made independent
given the ground-truth variable y, instead of the other way around. A stronger
sufficient condition is the independence of the statistic a itself, rather than the
utility variable.
Decision problems. While the aforementioned works focused on classifica-
tion, Dwork et al. [2012] consider general decision rules π : X → A maximising
expected utility, under a fairness constraint:
sup {Eπ U | ∆ (π(· | x), π(· | y)) ≤ ρ (x, y)∀x, y ∈ X } , (1)
where∆ (P,Q) is a divergence between distributions P,Q, and ρ (x, y) is a metric
in observation space. This formalizes a type of fairness where similar people are
treated similarly. Even though there is no inherent notion of a sensitive variable,
it’s possible to capture it in the observation metric to a limited extent. In a
similar decision-theoretic context, Corbett-Davies et al. [2017] consider tradeoffs
between utility maximization and satisfaction of constraints on distributions,
such as balance.
On sequential decision problems, such as multi-armed bandits and re-
inforcement learning, Joseph et al. [2016] define an algorithm as fair if it plays
arms with highest means most of the time. Jabbari et al. [2016] study a similar
notion for Markovian environments, whereby the algorithm’s is fair the algo-
rithm is more likely to play actions that have a higher utility under the optimal







Figure 1: Graphical model of the fairness as equity problem. Here, y, z are
clearly independent given a, θ. However, when we marginalize over θ they be-
come dependent.
2.1 Fairness, subjectivity and learning.
Unfortunately it may may impossible to find a non-trivial decision rule under
uncertainty, even for the case where only a single notion of fairness is appropri-
ate. While such a notion may be satisfied for the correct underlying distribution
Pθ, it may not hold for an arbitrary estimator: In the Bayesian case, even if all
Pθ in a family satisfy a fairness condition, the marginal distribution may not.
Going back to our example from the introduction, we can easily see the
impossibility of satisfying the disparate impact condition of Chouldechova [2016]
from Figure 1. In this case, even if y ⊥ z | a, θ, the same independence does
not hold if θ is latent, no matter how a is distributed. This is clear from the
graphical model, as y, z are connected through θ. When θ is observed, it is
blocking and independence can be achieved.
Pβ(y, z | a) =
∑
θ




Pθ(y | a)Pθ(z | a)β(θ) (3)
6= Pβ(y | a)Pβ(z | a). (4)
In the Bayesian setting, even if all the members of our family satisfy a fairness
condition, uncertainty about the correct distribution can create unfairness. In
the following, we begin by a definition of the Bayes optimal rule, and then
consider two achievable fairness constraints: smoothness and balance.
3 Fair Bayes decision rules
We begin with a simple statistical decision problem, where the decision maker
observes x ∈ X , then takes a decision a ∈ A and obtains utility U(y, a) depend-
ing on an outcome y ∈ Y generated from some unknown distribution Pθ(x | y).
We have some prior information β ∈ B in the form of a probability distribu-
tion on parameters θ ∈ Θ, an observation space X , an outcome space Y, and a
family F , {Pθ(y | x) | θ ∈ Θ } of distributions.
We consider a simple factorization, where β(θ | x, a) = β(θ), and a utility
function U : Y×A → R that only depends on our action and the outcome. The






Figure 2: The basic Bayesian decision problem with observations x, latent out-
come y, action a, utility U , unknown parameter θ, prior β.
Definition 1 (Bayes decision rule). The Bayes decision rule π : B×X → A is a
deterministic policy that maximizes the utility in expectation, i.e. takes action
π∗(β, x) ∈ argmax
a∈A
Uβ|x(a) (5)






Θ Pθ(y | x) dβ(θ) is the marginal distribution over outcomes
conditional on the observations.
We can define analogues of the fairness concepts listed previously in terms
of decision rules π, rather than any specific random variable. We will focus on
Bayesian decision rules, i.e. rules whose decisions solely depend upon a posterior
distribution.
3.1 Fairness as smoothness
The fairness notion in Dwork et al. [2012] requires action distributions to be
similar for similar individuals, but the question of what “similar” is left open to
the context. In the Bayesian setting, there is a natural candidate: the relevant
information about an individual encoded in the distribution of outcomes Pβ|x(y):
Definition 2 (Smoothly fair Bayesian decision rule). A stochastic decision rule
π : B × X → ∆(A) on 〈U,Θ,X ,Y,A〉 is (k, β | x)-fair with respect to the
observation x for some prior β if







where D (P‖Q) is some divergence between measures P and Q, and ∆ (P,Q)
is a (possibly different) divergence. It is simply (k, β)-prior-fair with respect to
the prior β, if
∆ (π(β, x), π(β′, x)) ≤ kD (β‖β′) , ∀x ∈ X . (8)
The first definition ensures that, people whose merit distribution is similar
under the same distribution β on parameters, will have a similar treatment. The
second definition looks instead at how the treatment of one particular person
who differ under a changing belief β on parameters.
We analyze Bayesian procedures that are commonly used in reinforcement
learning problems. The first algorithm samples the underlying parameter θ from
the posterior distribution and selects the decision that is optimal for the sample
(i.e. marginalising over outcomes y). This is commonly known as Thompson
samplingThompson [1933] in the reinforcement learning literatureWang et al.
[2005], Agrawal and Goyal [2012].
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Lemma 1. The Thompson sampling algorithm, i.e. making a decision a with
probability equal to
πTh(β | x)(a) = β ({ θ ∈ Θ | Eθ(U | a) > Eθ(U | a
′) } | x) , (9)
is prior-fair when ∆ is the KL divergence.
Proof. Thompson sampling can be seen as first drawing some θ̂ ∼ β(θ | x)
and then selecting the decision maximising Eθ̂(U | a) =
∫
Y U(y, a) dPθ̂(y | x),
which depends only on θ̂. Through the post-processing inequality, we obtain
the required result.
The second algorithm instead samples the latent outcome y, marginalis-
ing over parameters θ and corresponds to sampling actions according to their
stochastic dominance.
Lemma 2. Stochastic dominance sampling, i.e. making a decision a with prob-
ability equal to
πSD(β | x)(a) = Pβ|x ({ y ∈ Y | (U(y, a) > U(y, a
′) }) , (10)
is observation-fair when ∆ is the KL divergence.
Proof. This is in line with the proof of the previous lemma, but now we are
drawing outcomes y instead of parameters θ.
For single-shot decisions, sampling has no informational advantage, as there
is no exploration-exploitation trade-off. This makes the following result natural,
but one should keep in mind that it also applies to fact that the (intractable)
Bayes-optimal sequential decision rule is also deterministic.
Lemma 3. The Bayes-expected utility of stochastic dominance sampling is lower
than that of Thompson sampling, which in turn is lower than that of the Bayes
decision rule.
Proof. Let a∗(x) , maxa E(U | a, x) for some arbitrary distribution. Then for
any randomized policy π: Eπ(U | x) =
∫
A




a∗, x) dπ(a | x) = E(U | a∗, x) dπ(a | x). We first apply this to the distribution
β(θ) to obtain the result for Thompson sampling. For stochastic dominance,
note that Pβ(X > Y ) =
∫
Θ
Pθ(X > Y ) dβ(θ). As stochastic dominance can
be implemented by first sampling a parameter and then sampling a dominant
variable under this parameter, we can reapply this fact and obtain the final
result.
We now consider a simple extension of Thompson sampling, which takes k
parameter samples. As k → ∞, the algorithm becomes closer to the Bayes-
optimal.























Figure 3: The Bayesian decision problem with a sensitive variable z.
is (k, β)-fair, i.e.
∆
(












and (k−1/3, β)-optimal for U ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. The first claim follows from the fact that we obtain k independent draws
and from the additive property of the KL divergence. Optimality follows from
standard concentration inequalities. For example, from Hoeffding’s inequality,




2k -close to optimal. The result follows by choosing δ = k
−1/3, and using
the boundedness of the utility.
Although these algorithms are defined for simple decision problems, they can
be easily applied to sequential problems. This can be achieved if e.g. our decision
space is the set of all behavioural policies. Now we look at another notion
of fairness, which is instead places constraints on conditional independence of
random variables.
3.2 Fairness as balance
The balance requirement in Kleinberg et al. [2016] involves equality in the ex-
pectation of a score function (depending on an observation x) under different
values of a sensitive variable z, conditioned on the true (but latent) outcome y.
We can distinguish two cases for the dependency structure between x, y, z.
The first is a discriminative model satisfying y ⊥ z | x, θ, our decision depends
on x, but also on z, as x generates z. For a generative model satisfying x ⊥
z | y, θ, we only have that x is not independent of z if θ is latent. However, it
might still be possible to obtain a decision rule satisfying the following balance
condition, analogously to Kleinberg et al. [2016]:
Definition 3 (Balanced decision rule). A decision rule1 π(a | x) is balanced
with respect to P if a, z are independent under β for all y, i.e. if
P π(a, z | y) = P π(a | y)P π(z | y), (13)
where P π is the distribution induced by P and the decision rule π.
1Here we simplified the notation of the decision rule so that π(a | x) corresponds to the
probability of taking action a given observation x.
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Expanding the left hand side, we obtain




π(a | x)P (x | y, z)P (z | y) (15)
while for the right hand side, we have
P π(a | y) =
∑
x




π(a | x)P (x | y). (17)
Equating the two terms, we obtain that
∑
x
π(a | x) [P (x, z | y)− P (x | y)P (z | y)] = 0, ∀a, y, z, (18)
This implies two sufficient conditions: The first is x ⊥ z | y, but this
is something that depends entirely on P , rather than the decision rule itself.
Under the generative model of Figure 3b, this is achieved when θ is known, but
not necessarily under β. The second is that the policy probabilities for every
possible action a are orthogonal to the difference between the distribution of x
for every possible choice of z, y.













π(a | x) [P (z | y, x)− P (z | y)]






π(a | x) [P (z | y, x)− P (z | y)]
P (y | x)
P (y)
. (22)
This allows us to approximate the integral by sampling x, and can be useful for
e.g. regression problems.
3.2.1 The optimally balanced decision rule.
Such a rule would maximize expected utility under the balance constraint. In
our setting, however, we have no fixed P , but rather a belief β on a family of
distributions Pθ. This inherently makes our decision rule subjectively fair.
We consider two variants of subjective fairness in this context: credible fair-
ness and its natural relaxation, marginal fairness.
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Credible fairness. In the Bayesian setting, we have a family of models {Pθ }
with a corresponding subjective distribution β(θ). As no single model is correct
we need to consider fairness for every possible model. Rather than looking for
a single useful decision rule π such that:
∑
x
π(a | x) [Pθ(x, z | y)− Pθ(x | y)Pθ(z | y)] = 0, ∀x, y, z, θ
i.e. so that the constraint holds for all members {Pθ | θ ∈ Θ } of the family, we
instead choose to minimize some penalty function averaged over all models. For












to be the deviation from balance for decision rule π under parameter θ. We now
use this in the following definition:
Definition 4. A decision rule is ǫ-credibly fair under β, and p, q ≥ 0, when
ǫ ≥
∫
Θ C(π, θ) dβ(θ).
In order to find a rule trading off utility for balance, we can maximize a
convex combination of the expected utility and deviation. In particular, we can






fθ(w) , (1− λ)E
π
θ U − λC(π, θ) (25)
The rule maximising Eπβ f is a Bayes decision rule (Def. 1) for f under the
distribution β. To find this, we can restrict ourselves to parametric decision
rules, and use stochastic gradient descent. As in Section 3.1, if we only take
k < ∞ samples to perform the gradient ascent over, the policy becomes an
instance of k-Thompson sampling. When p = q = 2, the gradient procedure is
quite simple, and is given in App. A,
Marginal fairness. As an approximation, we can maximize with respect to
the marginal model, i.e.
fβ(w) , (1− λ)E
π


















where Eβ , Dβ are defined in terms of the marginal distribution Pβ ,
∫
Θ Pθ dβ(θ).
This could be a useful formulation if calculating the marginal is easier than
sampling.
A demonstration. Here we consider a discrete decision problem, for which
we generate 100 observations. In particular |X | = |Y| = |Z| = |A| = 4, and
U(y, a) = I {y = a}. The true model has a dependence of approximately 0.26.
These observations are used to calculate a posterior distribution β(θ). The prior
distribution is a simple Dirichlet-product, as the network is discrete, and we
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assume we know the structure, which is y → x → z. We then find two decision
rules. The first uses the k = 10 samples from the full posterior distribution,
and the second uses the marginal model. Figure 4 shows the estimated2 and
achieved3 utility (SU, MU) and dependence (SD, MD) for the sampling-based
and marginal decision rule respectively. Both rules are successful in trading off
utility and dependency, with the rules based on the complete distribution being






















Figure 4: Demonstration of balanced Bayes. The plots show a summary of
the estimated and real utility (U) and dependence (D) for a marginal (M) or
sampling-based (S) decision rule trained with the independent parametrization.
Figure 4a shows the utility and dependence as measured during the optimiza-
tion, while Figure 4b shows the actual utility and dependence for the marginal
and credible decision rules for the true underlying distribution, as we vary λ.
4 Conclusion
Existing fairness criteria may be hard to satisfy or verify in a learning setting
because they are defined for the true model. For that reason, we develop a
subjective fairness framework, which can encompass existing criteria from a
Bayesian viewpoint. This allows us to make some new connections, the stochas-
tic gradient ascent algorithm, for example, can simultaneously satisfy similarity
and independence definitions.
In addition, although the smoothness fairness criterion implies a stochastic
decision rule, this rule can become deterministic when the information about
individuals results in a singular distribution of the merit variable y. This implies
a link between the independence and similarity conditions for certain informa-
tion sets. In that case, it’s also easy to see that the independence criteria will
also be met. We believe that a further exploration of the informational aspects
of fairness, and in particular in the Bayesian setting, will be extremely fruitful.
2The function components, U , C targeted by the gradient algorithm.
3Measured using the true distribution Pθ.
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A Gradient calculations.




πw(· | x)D(x, y, z),
so that






























dPβ(x)∇wπw(a | x)Eβ(U | x, a) (29)










cw(y, z)aD(x, y, z) dΛ(x),
]
. (31)
where Λ is the Lebesgue measure. We now derive the gradient for the ∇wπw
term. We consider two parameterizations.
Independent policy parameters. When π(a | x) = wax, we obtain ∂π(a
′ |
x′)/∂ax = I {ax = a′x′}. This unfortunately requires projecting the policy pa-
rameters back to the simplex. For this reason, it might be better to use a
parameterization that allows unconstrained optimization.





















, a 6= a′ (33)
∂π(a | x)/∂a′x′ = 0, ax 6= a′x′. (34)
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